Fourth, the language and content of the agreements are very symmetrical and use phrases such as “contracting parties” and “signatories” instead of the right substantive. Although there are of course asymmetries in implementation (for example. B because of the relative power), these are separated from the treaties themselves and are better treated with control variables. Fifth, CAD is a 10-year long-term agreement. Many DCAs are indeterminate. With regard to theorizing of network flows, I focus on the ability of the creation of the DCA itself to send information to attentive third parties. I insist on the creation of DCA – not respect for DCA over time – for three reasons. First, although DCAs often contain “confidence” measures, ex ante trust remains a necessary condition. Second, even if trust is increased, these effects may not be measurable.
Some ACF activities – exchange of classified information, joint military research, coordination of defence policy – are difficult to observe. Third, DCAs provide information on scale, depth and other institutional design issues immediately after signing, regardless of compliance. However, later on, I insert areas in which the ex-post trust generated by observed compliance further strengthens network flows, especially when mediators are involved. 1.3 The modalities of this cooperation can be defined in concrete terms by agreements between the competent presidencies of the parties. Footnote 13 However, the common benefits tell only part of the story. Even if the demand for cooperation is high, information asymmetries can limit the supply of cooperative institutions. States often lack credible information on the reliability of the other or on the willingness to cooperate instead of exploiting the cooperation of others for unilateral purposes. Footnote 9 Given that DIACs deal with sensitive national security issues, including access to classified information, coordination of defence policies and the dissemination of advanced weapons technologies, these are inherently issues of trust. In addition, states may lack information on each other`s institutional preferences, such as the scope of .B preferred application and the precision of formal agreements leading to distributional conflicts. Footnote 10 If states are not or are unsure of the types of agreements that others are willing to sign, DCAs` offer remains low.
Overall, the FE`s estimates strongly support the assumptions, including the proposed causal mechanism. Not only do network influences stimulate DCA formation, but these influences disappear in Dyads with existing DIACs. Figure 10 shows the predictive margins of network variables in both samples, based on the estimates presented in Figure 9. With low levels of reciprocal levels, the probability of countries signing a first DCA is virtually nil. If the reciprocal degree reaches its median value, the probability of a first DCA is close to 75%. But for subsequent chords, designated by the dotted line (red), the degree of reciprocity is virtually irrelevant. Both lanes have an equally dramatic effect. With the minimum value of two lanes, the probability of a first DCA is about 25%. If two paths reach their median value, this probability increases to almost 75%. And as in the case of a reciprocal degree, the effect of two-way agreements on subsequent agreements is virtually nil.
These content forecasts confirm the conclusion that network flows depend on information mechanisms and are not false compared to omitted variables. Finally, the influence of the DCAs is almost certainly not limited to defence issues. DCAs are often signed along with a number of other agreements, including extradition treaties, double taxation agreements, anti-terrorism agreements and investment agreements. It is therefore possible to link DCAs to other types of contracts. Footnote 121 Countries can support DCAs as a security-oriented reward for c